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The sudden devaluation of the Mexican peso in late December (SourceMex, 01/05/95 and 01/11/95)
had a ripple effect on a number of markets in South America, where stock markets plunged after
foreign investors nervously began withdrawing their capital in fear that the Mexican devaluation
would trigger similar currency crises in other countries. Although sporadic market turbulence
continues given that the Mexican crisis is still unresolved, most South American markets have
rebounded, since local governments are drawing on substantial foreign reserves to boost their
currencies and reassure investors that exchange- rate stability will be maintained.
Nevertheless, the Mexican crisis will likely encourage the other countries especially Argentina
and Brazil to take concrete steps to correct their growing trade and current account deficits, since
the chronic gap between imports and exports represents a latent danger for the region's financial
stability. The estimated 40% decline in the value of the Mexican peso since the currency crisis
exploded in that country on Dec. 21 has caused monumental losses for foreign investors. Wall Street
investment experts, for example, estimate that US investors in stocks and bonds may have lost a
total of between US$8 and US$10 billion since mid-December. According to economists at DRI/
Mcgraw-Hill interviewed by the New York Times, US investors represent US$45 billion to US$50
billion of the US$73 billion in total foreign investment now in Mexico.
Of the US holdings, roughly US$15 billion is in direct investment in factories, machinery, and
buildings, which are largely immune to devaluation, particularly if their goal is to make goods
for export from Mexico. The remaining US$30 billion to US$35 billion, however, is in stocks,
government bonds, and other forms of interest-bearing peso securities, the value of which is directly
affected by devaluation. The largest losses since mid-December were reported by US investors
in Mexican stocks, since they suffered not only from the peso's devaluation, but also from falling
stock prices. Their total holdings were estimated at roughly US$20 billion as of Dec. 1, but the value
of those investments plunged to just US$13.5 billion by Dec. 26. In addition, the remaining US$12
billion to US$15 billion in peso notes and bonds held by US investors registered an estimated loss of
about US$3 billion as a direct result of the devaluation.
"These losses are spread out over a lot of people and institutions in the United States," Lawrence
Brainard, head of research for Chase Securities Emerging Markets Group, told the Times. "And now
these investors are trying to figure out whether to stay in Mexico or to sell their securities, take their
losses, and leave." Not surprisingly, given the huge losses that investors suffered nearly overnight
in Mexico, the peso crisis had a direct effect on stock markets throughout Latin America, since
investors in stocks and bonds in other countries in the region immediately began selling off their
holdings out of fear that the currency crisis in Mexico would trigger similar problems elsewhere.
Indeed, should a wave of devaluations hit the South American countries, investors would also suffer
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monumental losses as they did in Mexico, because most of the foreign investment that has poured
into other nations in the region in the last four years is also concentrated in "portfolio holdings"
in stocks and bonds, which would drop in value with devaluation. Of the US$115.4 billion in new
foreign investment that entered the region in 1992 and 1993, for example, only 27% was in direct
investments, with the remainder in stocks and bonds (see NotiSur, 09/15/94).
During the last week of December, Brazil reported that frantic investors had pulled the equivalent of
about US$1.5 billion out of the country. That would represent about 10% of foreign holdings on the
Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo stock exchanges, according to the local business daily Jornal do Brasil.
In neighboring Argentina, the Buenos Aires stock exchange slipped into a virtual tailspin after the
Mexican devaluation. From Dec. 22-29, the Buenos Aires stock exchange index plunged by 18%, and
the government was forced to spend more than US$700 million that week to meet dollar demand
and prop up the value of the peso, which has been on a parity with the US dollar since 1991. All told,
the Argentine stock market closed in 1994 with an accumulated decline for the year of about 20%.
Even in Chile, considered one of the most solid economies in the region, the value of trade fell
markedly as a result of the Mexican crisis. Just in the three-day period from Dec. 27-29, the Santiago
Stock Market's leading index "IPSA" (Indice de Precios Selectivo de Acciones de la Bolsa de
Comercio de Santiago) which includes the 40 most-traded stocks on the exchange dropped by a
total of nearly 4%. The market turmoil did subside somewhat by the end of December, and the
value of trade rebounded during the first week of January, largely because the Mexican government
announced an emergency economic stabilization plan to shore up the peso that is backed by US$18
billion in credit from the US, Canada, and other countries and lending institutions.
Nevertheless, market activity remains erratic since the Mexican crisis is still unresolved. In mid-
January, for example, the peso began to slide again given the lack of confidence so far by investors
in the Mexican government's handling of the crisis, which in turn triggered a new round of panicked
sell-offs by foreign investors on the South American stock exchanges. On Jan. 10, the Argentine
stock market fell by another 9.59%, while Brazil's leading stock index dropped 9.86%. Even in Chile
the stock market plunged by 4.86% in a day of frantic trading. "It is a total regional panic on the part
of local and foreign investors alike," said Brian Barish, head of Latin American strategy at Lazard
Freres. "Everybody is basically freaking out." South American governments distance themselves
from Mexico In part, the plunge on the markets in South America stems from selling by managers of
mutual funds who are trying to raise cash to hedge their losses in Mexico by salvaging profits in the
other countries.
Nevertheless, most of the turmoil is caused by uncontrollable jitters among foreign investors, who
fear that other countries especially Argentina and Brazil also suffer from overvalued currencies
like the Mexican peso. Thus, investors are concerned that the Mexican crisis could ignite a chain
reaction in the other nations in the same way that the 1982 failure by Mexico to honor its foreign
debt payments set off a traumatic series of Latin American defaults that culminated in the debt
crisis of the 1980s. In response, since the Mexican crisis exploded in December, South American
governments have repeatedly attempted to assure investors that their economies are much stronger
than Mexico's, and that no devaluations will be forthcoming. In particular, regional leaders stress
that, unlike the early 1980s, nearly all of the South American countries have carried out profound
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structural adjustment programs that have stabilized the region's economies and reduced the
pressures for currency devaluations.
As a result, the domino phenomenon that characterized the debt crisis in the past decade is unlikely
to be repeated, since each nation's economic performance must be evaluated independently of
Mexico. "By now, financial experts have learned that there is significant diversity throughout Latin
America," said Sebastian Edwards, the World Bank's chief economist for the region. "People have to
avoid the herd instinct that was very damaging in 1982. There is not really a solid reason to sell off in
one country because of what happens in another country." Indeed, only some of the problems that
led to the currency crisis in Mexico are present in Argentina and Brazil, the two other large countries
that are widely considered to have overvalued currencies.
In Mexico, the rate of inflation in 1994 was substantially higher than in the US, but the small slide in
the peso throughout the year was not steep enough to account for that differential, which led to the
currency overvaluation. As a result, Mexico became comparatively too expensive. That, combined
with the elimination or lowering of tariffs under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), resulted in an unprecedented trade deficit of US$28 billion last year. Since the current
account deficit was financed by foreign investment the vast majority in highly volatile portfolio
holdings a dangerous dollar crunch developed when investors began to withdraw from Mexico last
year, largely because of political instability and uncertainty. Mexico's foreign reserves fell from US
$30 billion in January to just US$6 billion by the end of the year. Moreover, some US$28 billion in
bonds in Mexico will come due this year, but even with the US$18 billion in credit promised by the
US, Canada, and others at the end of December,
Mexico still does not have enough available reserves to cover its debt, which is why the peso
devaluation continued in mid-January. In contrast, in Argentina the government has stressed that
the peso parity with the US dollar reflects a much more stable performance by the economy than
in Mexico. Last year, Argentina boasted an annual inflation rate of just 3.6% the lowest in South
America largely because the government has upheld strict fiscal and monetary policies. At the
same time, the GDP expanded by another 6% in 1994, bringing accumulated growth to 33% for the
1990-1994 period. The peso parity with the US dollar combined with the lowering of tariffs through
Argentina's membership in the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) has stunted export
growth while encouraging a flood of imports. That, in turn, has inverted the trade surplus that
Argentina enjoyed until the peso-dollar parity was established in 1991 to a record trade deficit in
1994 of nearly US$6 billion.
But unlike in Mexico where the trade deficit is nearly six times more than in Argentina the latter
country still has a hefty US$17 billion in accumulated foreign reserves to cover its current account
deficit. Moreover, although Argentina has also relied on volatile foreign investments to cover its
deficits, only US$5 billion in public debt is scheduled to mature this year, meaning that Argentina
has ample resources to meet its debt obligations. "We are not Mexico and we will not devalue
Argentina will not alter its course," said President Carlos Menem in a televised address to the
nation in late December aimed at underlining his government's determination to stick to its foreign
exchange policy. "There will not be a devaluation. Totally to the contrary, we are going to deepen
the adjustment measures."
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In Brazil, economic stability is still a long way off, but the stabilization plan launched in July of last
year has dramatically reduced inflation. Under the plan, which established a parity between local
currency and the US dollar, the consumer price index plummeted from nearly 50% per month in
the first half of 1994 to between 2% and 3% throughout the second semester (see NotiSur, 09/08/94,
09/29/94, and 10/27/94). Moreover, the Jan. 1 inauguration of Brazil's new president, Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, foreshadows strict government efforts to maintain the stabilization plan on track,
since Cardoso was the plan's architect last year. Indeed, Cardoso has promised to immediately
seek profound tax reforms, budget cuts, and a major acceleration of the privatization program to
radically lower the country's fiscal deficit and pull inflation down to below 25% by year-end 1995.
Perhaps more important, Brazil's trade and foreign currency status is the inverse of Mexico's, greatly
alleviating the pressure to devalue local currency in the short to medium term.
Brazil registered a hefty US$11.5 billion trade surplus last year, and the country boasts a whopping
US$43 billion in foreign reserves, which is enough to finance an estimated 16 months of imports.
"In Brazil, there is no hypothesis that calls for a currency devaluation," said President Cardoso
in early January after reviewing the Mexican crisis with his newly inaugurated cabinet. Mexico
crisis provides painful lessons Still, notwithstanding the differences between Mexico and the
Southern Cone countries, the peso crisis has served as a warning to Argentina and Brazil that
an overvalued currency is unsustainable in the medium to long term. While both countries are
taking steps to tighten their anti-inflation programs, they must also implement measures to correct
trade imbalances to avoid financing current account deficits with volatile "soft loans" from foreign
investors.
Brazil in particular will be hard pressed to maintain its trade surplus, since the strengthening of
consumer purchasing power as a result of the stabilization program plus the lowering of import
tariffs through Mercosur has led to a dramatic increase in demand for imported goods since last
year. Brazil's US$11.5 billion trade surplus in 1994 actually represented a 12% decline compared with
the US$13 billion surplus reported in 1993, and in November and December the country registered
its first monthly trade deficits since 1987. In 1995, the trade surplus is expected to drop by more than
half. After factoring in Brazil's foreign debt payments and remittances this year, the current account
deficit is expected to surge to US$10 billion by year-end 1995, up from just US$1 billion in 1994. "A
yellow light has switched on, warning Brazil that it cannot go from megasurpluses to megadeficits in
trade," said Carlos Langoni, a former president of Brazil's central bank. "The great Mexican lesson is
the importance of maintaining reasonably balanced trade over the next few years."
Added Ernane Galveas, who served as finance minister in Brazil in the early 1980s: "Mexico is a
warning to Brazilians not to play around with an overvalued exchange rate. We are frittering away
the export surpluses we built up during the 1980s." In the short term, however, the most daunting
task for Southern Cone countries may be to rebuild investor confidence in their economies.
The peso debacle shattered faith in government promises that present economic policies will
be maintained, since the Mexican government had repeatedly insisted that it had no intention
of devaluing the peso, and then virtually overnight the currency slid by up to 40%, ushering in
Mexico's worst financial crisis since the debt default of 1982. "Mexico's officials were perceived
as the most credible in Latin America," Lars Schonander, Latin American economist for Baring
Securities, recently told the New York Times. "Their word was good. Now their word is not good.
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Where does that leave Brazil, a country with an appalling record of economic plans going up in
flames." (Sources: Notimex, 01/01- 03/95; Associated Press, 01/02/95, 01/03/95; Knight-Ridder
Financial Information, 01/04/95, 01/05/95; Inter-American Trade Monitor, Inter Press Service,
01/05/95; Reuter, 12/29/94, 01/08/95; Spanish news service EFE, 12/30/94, 01/05/95, 01/08/95; Agence
France-Presse, 12/16/94, 12/17/94, 12/22/94, 12/26-31/94, 01/02-04/95, 01/06/95, 01/07/95, 01/09- 11/95;
New York Times, 12/26/95, 01/03/95, 01/05/95, 01/10/95, 01/11/95)
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